What this proof shows — and what it doesn't

A zero-knowledge proof, verified on the zkVerify network, shows that someone holding a one-time session secret bound this exact image (by its SHA-256 hash), the capture timestamp, the location (if shared), and an unpredictable public beacon (if reachable) together at proving time inside the zkShot capture flow. The beacon, when present, proves the commitment could not have been formed before the time shown in the Time anchor row. If the image integrity check above passes, the image displayed here is byte-identical to the one committed in that proof.

It does not cryptographically prove the photo came from a physical camera sensor, nor that the timestamp or location are accurate — browsers cannot access hardware attestation, and both values are asserted by the capturing device. It also says nothing about what was in front of the camera: photographing a printed picture, another screen, or any staged scene produces an equally valid capture proof of a fake image. Treat it as evidence of an unbroken chain from the zkShot capture session, not as forensic proof of origin or authenticity.

Verification happens at source: this page checks the originally stored bytes. Copies of the photo shared on social platforms are recompressed in transit and cannot be re-verified byte-for-byte — the proof travels with this link, not with the image. For independent verification without trusting this site, download the verification bundle below.