What this proof shows — and what it doesn't

A zero-knowledge proof, verified on the zkVerify network, shows that someone holding a one-time session secret bound this exact image (by its SHA-256 hash), the capture timestamp, the location (if shared), and a device commitment together at proving time inside the zkShot capture flow. If the image integrity check above passes, the image displayed here is byte-identical to the one committed in that proof.

It does not cryptographically prove the photo came from a physical camera sensor, nor that the timestamp or location are accurate — browsers cannot access hardware attestation, and both values are asserted by the capturing device. It also says nothing about what was in front of the camera: photographing a printed picture, another screen, or any staged scene produces an equally valid capture proof of a fake image. Treat it as evidence of an unbroken chain from the zkShot capture session, not as forensic proof of origin or authenticity.